This study is an empirical work that investigates whether capital structure is valuerelevant for the equity investor. In this sense, the paper links empirical corporate finance issues with investment analysis. We integrate the Miller-Modigliani framework (1958) into an investment approach by estimating abnormal returns on leverage portfolios in the time-series for different risk classes. For most risk classes, abnormal returns decline in firm leverage. However, abnormal returns increase as average leverage in a risk class increases. The separation of the average level of external financing in an industry and of that in a particular firm is important. Utilities for which Miller-Modigliani (1958) report their empirical results (i.e., that returns increase in firm leverage) are in fact risk classes with high concentrations and firm leverage ratios very close both to one another and to the industry average. In the Utilities risk class, abnormal returns increase in firm leverage. For other risk classes, this is not the case and abnormal returns decline in firm leverage and increase in industry leverage. Results are robust with regard to other risk factors.
Introduction
This study is an empirical work that investigates whether capital structure is value-relevant for the equity investor. In this sense, the paper links empirical corporate finance issues with investment analysis. The results show that low-debt companies have significant abnormal returns, which are extremely high for the smallest companies. Miller-Modigliani (1958) 1 report evidence of a positive relationship between equity returns and leverage in selected industries. Evidence in the cross-section of all stocks is mixed: Bhandari (1988) report a positive relationship while empirical evidence reported by Korteweg (2004) and Masulis (1983) is negative. Fama and French (1992) find that market leverage is positively associated with returns, while book leverage is negatively related. Therefore, they argue that the difference between the two measures, book-to-market equity, helps to explain average returns. DeAngelo et al. (2006) explain that although high leverage mitigates agency problems, it also reduces financial flexibility because the utilisation of the current borrowing capacity translates into less availability in the future.
We integrate MM into an investment approach by estimating abnormal returns on leverage portfolios in the time-series for various risk classes as defined by the industries they operate in. We estimate the effect of leverage on abnormal returns in a cross-section of firms, taking into account several risk factors, including book-tomarket and others described by Fama and French (1992) . Results are robust with regard to other risk factors. We show that equity returns increase in leverage for some risk classes but decrease in leverage for others. We find that firms in risk classes such as the utilities and oil & gas sectors have abnormal returns that increase in leverage.
These results are consistent with the findings of MM, who employ these industries in 1 Hereafter referred to as MM.
their empirical tests. Firms in most other risk classes experience abnormal returns that decrease in leverage, supporting the findings of authors who use mixed samples of firms.
Theoretical finance has always regarded debt as one of the principle sources of financial risk. According to MM's seminal work on capital structure, firm value is independent of financing decisions. The authors rigorously show that the value of a firm is determined by the rate of return on real assets-and not by the mix of securities that are issued. An immediate implication of MM's propositions on equity returns is that they should increase in leverage. This is indeed the case in the crosssection of firms in a certain risk class of Utilities and Oil & Gas industries as revealed by the authors' findings. Additionally, following similar studies by Bradley et al (1984) , Titman(1984) , Hull(1999) , Lang et al(1996) , Mackay et al (2005) based on leverage and industry classification, we classify our sample industry wise to examine the impact of firm and industry leverage on cumulative abnormal returns.
In MM, equity returns are represented by the average cost of capital in a oneyear period and estimations are conducted in a cross-section of a particular risk class.
We represent equity returns as cumulative abnormal returns for a holding period of one year, which representation is easier for an investor to interpret. We use panel data that contains information for a 25-year period and combines the cross-section with the time series. In MM, the only independent variable is the leverage ratio and its square to test the linearity of the relationship. In our study, in addition to the leverage ratio and its square, we use five additional variables that reflect idiosyncratic risk, including the risk factors described by Fama and French (1992) and the particular environment's cost of borrowing in order to account for changes in the cost of capital in the time series that explain abnormal returns. MM conduct their tests within two industries, each representing a coherent risk class, namely the oil and utilities sectors.
We, however, do not limit our research simply to two sectors. Instead, our study encompasses all non-financial firms across the nine sectors that cover all the various classes of risk.
Hamada (1972) tests the relationship between a firm's leverage and its common stock's systematic risk over a cross-section of all firms. He uses industry as a proxy for business risk, since his sample lacks a sufficient number of firms to yield statistically significant coefficients. Our sample size enables us to undertake crosssectional analysis separately for each risk class. Bradley et al (1984) also suggested that industrial classification is a good proxy for business risk across industries. We also control for business risk by regressing abnormal returns on beta (i.e., market risk)
as well as on leverage and other risk factors. By utilising an additional examination of pure capital structure changes, Masulis (1983) shows that change in leverage is positively related to change in stock returns. He studies daily stock returns following exchange offers and re-capitalisations where recapitalisations occur at a single time.
However, his work also contains limitations. His sample contains a group of all companies that have gone through pure capital structure changes, which might represent a certain risk class itself. Therefore, one must be careful in assuming that characteristics of firms in this sub-sample are representative of all firms. In this study, we study abnormal returns in a panel that includes the cross-section of all firms in all risk classes.
Bhandari (1988) indirectly tests the second of MM's propositions by examining whether expected common stock returns are positively related to the ratio of debt in the cross-section of all firms without assuming various industry-defined risk classes. His results provide evidence that leverage has a significant positive effect on expected common stock returns. His returns are adjusted for inflation, whereas our abnormal returns are market-adjusted, but using interest rates as an explanatory variable to account for changes in the cost of capital in the time series. Bhandari (1988) controls for idiosyncratic risk through size and beta; in addition to these variables, we utilise two others: price-to-book and price-earnings ratios. Korteweg (2004) also tests the aforementioned MM proposition. His tests are based on pure capital structure changes (i.e., exchange offers). He controls for business risk by assuming non-zero debt betas and uses a time series approach. In our study, we use a cross-sectional approach to test whether leverage is value-relevant by investigating excess returns generated by holding portfolios based on a company's leverage. Since our sample is not limited and includes a cross-section of all firms, we do not assume zero debt betas and avoid additional assumptions when calculating separate debt betas and asset betas. Hull (1999) measures market reaction to common stock offerings with the sole purpose of debt reduction and reports a negative immediate responseincreasingly more so for firms further from the industry norm. Our sample is not as limited as Hull's and includes a cross-sectional examination of all firms. Additionally, we do not employ a short-run perspective. While Hull measures immediate wealth maximisation using three-day cumulative returns, we assume a one-year holding period for our portfolios, which assumption is in keeping with MM and Schwartz (1959) .
Dimitrov and Jain (2005) measure the effect of leverage changes on stock returns as well as on earnings-based measures of performance. Their results reveal a negative correlation between debt-to-equity ratio and risk-adjusted stock returns. The authors study how changes in levels of debt are negatively associated with contemporaneous and future-adjusted returns. In this paper, we investigate the ability of leverage to predict stock returns by using a cross-section of these ratios rather than changes over time. Also, we do not distinguish between the operating and investing activities of a firm, as we are concerned with the excess returns an investor can make from the overall activities of a company in a one-year investment horizon.
Miao (2005) develops an industry model of equilibrium between capital structure choices and production decisions made by firms facing idiosyncratic technological shocks. His results show that technology (i.e., productivity) is important in determining a firm's probability of survival and leverage ratio. His work also looks into understanding the theoretical impact of financing policies on firm turnover. In this paper, we classify our sample according to industry in order to study crosssectional cumulative abnormal returns. We do not individually address the financing needs or production decisions of each industry.
Following Miller (1977) and Myers (1977) , there is considerable work that investigates the determinants of change in capital structure and the stability of capital structure choices and reversions over time. Mayer and Sussman (2004) , for example, find clear evidence that capital structure reverts back to previous levels of leverage following a spike in investment. Flannery et al. (2004) show that firms do in fact observe target capital structures. They argue that it is 'targeting behaviour' which explains changes in firms' capital structures rather than the pecking-order theory (Myers 1984) or the market-timing theory, as posited by Myers (1984) and Baker et al. (2002 ), respectively. Alti (2006 finds that hot-market firms leverage ratios increase significantly two years following the IPO; however, cold market firms appear to be content with the leverage ratios they attain at the IPO. He concludes that market timing is an important determinant of financing activity in the short-run but that its long-run effects are limited. Ahn et al. (2006) investigate the relationship between investment patterns and leverage. They show that firms with diversified investments have higher leverage than firms with more focused investments. This study investigates neither the determinants of multiple capital structure choices nor changes in capital structures over time. Our main goal is to explore the effect of capital structure on cumulative abnormal returns. In doing so, we control for idiosyncratic risk factors commonly used in investments. These risk factors include price-earnings ratio (Campbell and Schiller (1988) ), size (Banz (1981) and Chan and Chen (1991) ), book-to-market ratio (Chan, Hamao and Lakonishok (1991) ) and a combination of these, including beta (Fama and French (1992; 1996) ).
We also investigate the impact of industry leverage on stock returns. Schwartz (1959) explains that the optimal capital structure varies for firms in different industries because asset structures and stability of earnings, which determine inherent risk classes, vary for different types of production. We argue that industry leverage should prove useful in predicting the direction and magnitude of stock returns when investors evaluate a stock's true worth. Bradley et al (1984) found that 54% of the cross-sectional variance in firm leverage ratios can be explained by industrial classification. They suggested that industrial classification is a good proxy for business risk. Titman (1984) concludes that firms manufacturing machines and equipment should be financed with relatively less debt. Titman et al (1988) , while examining the determinants of capital structure, find that debt levels are negatively related to the uniqueness of a firm's line of business. While our model does not study the determinants of capital structure, we do examine the relevance of industry leverage on stock returns. Hull (1999) such as size, book-to-market and momentum they find that firms in more competitive industries earn higher stock returns. In this paper, we examine a firm's cumulative average abnormal returns by measuring leverage at the firm level and at the average level for the firm's industry. We also examine other factors, such as size, priceearnings, market-to-book and betas.
In Section 2, we describe the rationale behind our sample-selection procedure, variables used and the methodology applied to our study. The results are presented in Section 3. Finally, Section 4 presents the conclusions and discusses the scope of possibilities for further research.
Data and Methodology
The source for all of our data is Schwatz (1959) argues that the narrow definition of financial structure-i.e., that it is restricted to stocks and bonds-ignores the large measure of substitutability between the various forms of debt; thus, a broader definition encompassing the breadth of all liabilities and claims of ownership must be used. He proposes the ratio of total debt to net worth as the best single measure of gross risk. Firms in various industries have different asset structures that are financed by cash flows generated from various forms of debt and equity. The use of both variables' book values ensures that we measure the capital structure via the cash flows generated at the time those assets are financed. Schwartz (1959) also argues that an optimum capital structure for a widely held company is one which maximises the long-run value of the common stock per share. Our analysis is based on the same understanding. The use of book values for debt and equity has the additional advantage of using the market value of equity neither to define the change in value nor in concurrent capital structure.
Following Fama and French (1992) , we account for the difference between the two by using book-to-market ratio as a risk factor. Kayhan et al. (2006) suggested that the significance of the historical book-to-market in leverage regressions may be due to the noise in the current book-to-market.
We use a company's market value (Datastream code: MV) to represent company size. Market capitalisation is the share price multiplied by the number of ordinary shares in issue. The price-to-book value (Datastream code: PTBV) refers to a company's share price divided by the net book value. The price-earnings ratio (Datastream code: PER) refers to the ratio of price to earnings. The market risk measure is the beta coefficient (β), which we estimate over a five-year period in a rolling window using monthly data. We also take into account the impact of market Stock returns for each company are calculated monthly using percentage change in consecutive closing prices adjusted for dividends splits and rights issues (Fama et al. (1969) The next step in our analysis is to determine whether cumulative abnormal returns at the stock level can be explained by the leverage of the firms and to examine a number of idiosyncratic risk factors in the cross-section and interest rates that control for changes in cost of capital within the environment of the time series.
Idiosyncratic risk factors include: market risk; size price-to-earnings ratio; and priceto-book ratio. First, we run the below regression in the full sample. Then we partition the data according to the different risk classes represented by each industry, formally testing for the effect of leverage in each risk class while accounting for the effect of these additional factors on CAARs.
In equation (3), CAAR is defined as in equation (1); a stands for constant; LEVERAGE 2 is measured as the ratio of total debt to total equity plus debt; BETA is the market risk estimated over the preceding five years; SIZE refers to the log of total market capitalisation; BM and PE refer to the ratio of price-to-book and the ratio of price to earnings respectively; INTEREST refers to the average monthly Bank of England (BoE) rate over the portfolio holding period; and ε is the error term. We estimate equation (3) have about seven hundred and ninety observations in each decile. To ensure that we avoid forward-looking biases, the annual decile assignments are made according to the available information as of May 1 of the following year, at which point all of the annual reports are published. Next, we sort the leverage deciles according to priceearnings (PE) ratios, decile 1 denoting the lowest PE and decile 10 the highest. We repeat the exercise with sub-samples based on size (SIZE), which is defined as total market capitalization of the company, price-to-book ratio (PTBV) and market risk (BETA).
Panel A in Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the five variables:
cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs); leverage; price-earnings ratio; priceto-book; market value; and beta. CAARs and beta are calculated from monthly data;
leverage, price-earnings ratio, price-to-book and market values are as of year end. The sample's mean and the median CAARs are 3.34% and 3.02%, respectively. The distribution is highly dispersed with a standard deviation of 40.1% and a range between -232% and 849%. As can be clearly observed from the JB statistic, nonnormality exists in the data set with a skewness coefficient of 1 Table 2 reports Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAARs). Stock returns for each company are calculated monthly using percent change in consecutive closing prices that have been adjusted for dividends splits and rights issues (Fama et al. (1969) ) across the leverage deciles for the entire sample as well as for each risk class. Decile 1 contains the firms with the lowest leverage and decile 10 contains those with the highest. For the overall sample, the mean debt ratio for low debt firms is 0.28%; for high debt firms it is 62%. The mean leverage increases monotonically to 5% in decile 2, then to 12% in decile 3. Deciles 4 and 5 have a mean leverage of 18%
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and 24%, respectively. The mean debt ratio in decile 6 is 29%; decile 7 has a mean leverage of 34%; and deciles 8 and 9 have mean leverages of 39% and 46%, respectively. *****insert table 2 here***** Cumulative abnormal returns for the overall sample at the end of the twelve month holding period are presented in column 3 of Table 1 . Figure 1 presents the CAARs for each leverage decile monthly over the 12-month holding period. For the overall sample, the CAAR for low levered firms of decile 1 is 6.28%. On the other hand, firms in decile 10 (i.e., those with the highest leverage) earn CAARs that are not significantly different from zero. For the overall sample, the CAAR decrease as leverage increases. Firms in deciles 2 and 3 earn 6% and 6.49%, respectively, during the holding period. Cumulative abnormal returns decrease to 3.52% and 5.54% for firms in deciles 4 and 5, respectively; then decline continues for deciles 6, 7 and 8, reaching 2.3%, 1.84% and 2.6%, respectively. Cumulative abnormal returns are not significantly different from zero for firms in deciles 9 and 10. If leverage were used as a trading strategy and an investor were to invest in the lowest leverage firms with an average debt burden of 0.28%, he would be able to earn a cumulative abnormal return of 6.28% in one year's time and a staggering 491% during the 24-year research period. Alternatively, if he were to invest in firms with the highest leverage and carry an average debt burden of 62%, he would earn a negative annual average abnormal return of -0.99%, which, with annually rebalanced portfolios, would amount to a loss of 78% during the 24-year research period. *****insert Figure 1 here*****
In Table 2 There is a considerable amount of literature on the differences in leverage due to industry characteristics. Brown et al. (1982) show that there is a difference between mean industry capital structures and that each industry tends to have an optimal debt ratio due to tax benefits. Bradley et al. (1984) Banz (1981) and Chan and Chen (1991)), book-to-market ratio (Chan, Hamao and Lakonishok (1991)) or a combination of these factors (Fama and French (1992; 1996) ) as determinants in investors' value maximisation. Of course, the question arises whether leverage ratio is the sole contributing factor or rather only one of the contributing factors in the cumulative returns. Below, we will undertake a series of tests in order to investigate if other factors or combination thereof could have contributed to the obtained results. regressions, we take the cost of debt in the particular environment into account by using interest rate as an explanatory factor for CAARs. *****insert Table 3 here***** Cumulative abnormal returns are positive for all leverage levels for low PE firms, although CAARs decline from 16.51% in the lowest leverage and lowest PE deciles to 5.52% for firms in the highest leverage and lowest PE deciles. Similarly, for firms in the highest PE ratio decile, CAARs decline from 3.27% for low leverage firms to -7.49% for the highest leverage firms.
Are the Results Calendar-Varying?
Leverage and Market Risk
*****insert Table 5 here***** In all leverage deciles, CAARs decrease in PTBV.
Leverage and Price-to-Book Ratio
*****insert Table 6 here***** Table 7 reports CAARs for portfolios based on leverage and size. Our results indicate that CAARs are slightly higher for small companies with low leverage. The smallest companies (in size decile 1) earn abnormal returns between 8% and 14% if they have leverage ratios below the median, and between 6% and -3% if they have leverage ratios above the median. Large companies earn slightly lower CAARs, ranging between -4% and 3.5% yearly.
Leverage and Size
*****insert Table 7 here***** Table 8 here***** 7 We repeat estimations with a interaction term between leverage and beta and find that the coefficient estimates for the interaction terms are not significant in most of the cases. 8 We repeat all the estimations with backward and forward stepwise regressions. Results (not reported here) do not alter our conclusions. 
Cross-Sectional Regression Results
Conclusion
This study is an empirical work that shows that equity returns increase in leverage for some risk classes and decrease in leverage for others. Firms in industries such as Utilities, that MM employ in their empirical tests, have abnormal returns that increase in leverage. Firms in most other industries experience abnormal returns that 9 We run alternative regressions using all the other variables and industry average leverage as the only leverage variable (excluding the firm leverage variable). Coefficient estimates for average industry leverage have the same significance levels and signs as in We acknowledge the fact that debt requirements for each risk class differ and that certain heavy industries require a higher leverage, while also acknowledging that average leverage levels within a risk class may differ due to macroeconomic factors such as interest rates, yet each company within a risk class may have its own unique reasons for a capital structure preference. Our results are robust with regard to other risk factors. CAARs decline in PE, PTBV, size, market risk and interest rates. Firms' capital structure policies appear to be largely consistent with the existence of leverage targets. Because capital structure is endogenous, we argue that the optimal financial policy is one that advocates low leverage, so as to mitigate agency problems while preserving financial flexibility. Profitable firms may keep their leverage levels low so as to prevent too a proportion of profit being used for interest payments. This notion leads to another school of thought: i.e., whether firms, in their attempt to keep leverage levels low, avoid taking on profitable opportunities and investments, hence throwing away their firm value. The negative relationship between returns and leverage could also be due to the market's pricing of the firm's ability to raise funds if need be.
Further avenues for research in this area include examining the stock return performance of companies based on the changes in leverage of the firms relative to their risk classes. It would be particularly noteworthy to examine the rate at which the information content of said changes is incorporated in the share prices of companies as well as in their long run returns. Research could also be undertaken to study the existence of a level optimal industry leverage separate from that of optimal firm
leverage. An optimal industry debt ratio would indicate whether firms in the industry actually outperform the market when they adhere to this optimal industry leverage ratio. . The interest rates observed as of the beginning of May of year t to the end of April of year t+1 are averaged over the 12-month period. Portfolio assignments are made yearly at the beginning of May in year t until the end of April of year t+1. All non-financial companies listed on London Stock Exchange (LSE) which meet the criteria of the data requirements for the research study are allocated to the 10 debt portfolios. Each debt group is then subdivided into 10 price-earnings portfolios, followed by 10 price-tobook portfolios, then 10 size portfolios, and finally 10 beta portfolios. Average industry leverage ratios are calculated by averaging the leverage of each company in each industry sector in May of year t. Correlation refers to the correlation of firm leverage with average industry leverage. Table 2 reports the average leverage and CAARs for a holding period of 12 months for each leverage decile for the full sample and for each risk class. We have a total of 7954 year-end observations for a sample of 792 companies for the period 1980-2004. Stock returns for each company are calculated on a monthly basis and are defined as the percentage difference of consecutive closing prices adjusted for dividends, splits and rights issues. The returns are accumulated from May of year t over a one-year period (CAARs). Portfolio assignments are made yearly at the beginning of May in year t until the end of April of year t+1. The first column shows the average leverage for each decile. The second column shows the average cumulative abnormal returns (CAARs).Leverage is obtained from Datastream (Datastream Code: WC08221). It represents the total debt to total financing of the firm and is defined as in equation (1). Portfolio assignments are made yearly at the beginning of May in year t until the end of April of year t+1. All non-financial companies listed on London Stock Exchange (LSE) which meet the criteria of the data requirements for the research study are allocated to the 10 leverage portfolios. Leverage decile 1 (LOW) represents the firms with the lowest leverage while decile 10 (HIGH) represents firms with the highest leverage. The second column shows the average leverage for each group. The third column shows the average cumulative returns (CAARs). Here we broadly classify the 82 sectors into nine main industries as per Datastream classification: oil & gas (0001), basic materials (1000), industrials (2000), consumer goods (3000), healthcare (4000), consumer services (5000), telecommunications (6000), utilities (7000) and technology (9000). We sort the sample companies industry-wise as per the Datastream classification and then rank the debt level of each company in each industry from low to high. Table 4 reports the results of the portfolios based on leverage ratio and beta for 1980-2004. Leverage is observed as of the beginning of May of year t (Datastream Code: WC08221). It represents the total debt to total financing of the firm. The market risk measure is the beta coefficients estimated over five years using monthly data and is observed as of the beginning of May of year t. Stock returns for each company are calculated on a monthly basis and are defined as the percentage difference of consecutive closing prices adjusted for dividends, splits and rights issues. The returns are accumulated from May of year t over a one-year period (CAARs). The CAARs of all non-financial companies listed on London Stock Exchange (LSE) which meet the criteria of the data requirements for the research study are allocated to the 10 leverage portfolios. Portfolio assignments are made yearly at the beginning of May in year t until the end of April of year t+1. Each leverage decile is subdivided into 10 beta portfolios. Leverage decile 1 (LOW) denotes firms with the lowest leverage ratios and Leverage decile 10 (HIGH) represents firms with the highest leverage. Beta decile 1 represents low risk firms and beta decile 10 represents firms with high risk. WC08221) . It represents the total debt to total financing of the firm. The price-earnings ratio (Datastream code: PER) is the price divided by the earnings rate per share and is taken as of the beginning of May of year t. Each leverage group is subdivided into 10 price-earnings portfolios. Leverage decile 1 (LOW) denotes the lowest leverage and leverage decile 10 (HIGH) represents firms with the highest leverage. P/E decile 1 denotes firms with the lowest price-earnings ratio and P/E decile 10 contains firms with the highest price-earnings ratio. Stock returns for each company are calculated on a monthly basis and are defined as the percentage difference of consecutive closing prices adjusted for dividends, splits and rights issues. The returns are accumulated from May of year t over a one-year period (CAARs). Portfolio assignments are made yearly at the beginning of May in year t until the end of April of year t+1. All non-financial companies listed on London Stock Exchange (LSE) which meet the criteria of the data requirements for the research study are allocated to the 10 leverage portfolios. Table 6 : Leverage and Price-to-Book Table 6 reports the results of the portfolios based on leverage and price-to-book ratio for 1980-2004. Leverage is obtained as of the beginning of May of year t (Datastream Code: WC08221). It represents the total debt to total financing of the firm. The price-to-book value (Datastream code: PTBV) of companies is the share prices of companies divided by the net book value and is observed as of the beginning of May of year t. Stock returns for each company are calculated on a monthly basis and are defined as the percentage difference of consecutive closing prices adjusted for dividends, splits and rights issues. The returns are accumulated from May of year t over a one-year period (CAARs). Portfolios are formed yearly at the beginning of May in year t until the end of April of year t+1.All non-financial companies listed on London Stock Exchange (LSE) which meet the criteria of the data requirements for the research study are allocated to the 10 leverage portfolios. Portfolio assignments are made yearly at the beginning of May in year t until the end of April of year t+1. Each leverage group is subdivided into 10 price-to-book ratio portfolios. Leverage decile 1 (LOW) denotes firms with the lowest leverage and leverage decile 10 (HIGH) represents firms with the highest leverage. PTBV decile 1 denotes firms with the lowest price-to-book ratios and PTBV decile 10 denotes firms with the highest price-to-book ratios. Table 9 reports the cross-sectional regression results on cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) and average industry leverage, leverage, size, price-earnings ratio, price-tobook ratio and market risk (beta). The figures in parenthesis report the t-statistics for each variable. We have a total of 7954 year-end observations for a sample of 792 companies for the period 1980-2004. We broadly classify these 82 sectors into nine main industries: oil & gas (0001), basic materials (1000), industrials (2000), consumer goods (3000), healthcare (4000), consumer services (5000), telecommunications (6000), utilities (7000) and technology (9000). We use GMM estimators and fixed effects for firms with whitening in the crosssections to undertake the regressions. We sort all the sample companies industry-wise in the aforementioned manner. Stock returns for each company are calculated on a monthly basis and are defined as the percentage difference of consecutive closing prices adjusted for dividends, splits and rights issues. The returns are accumulated from May of year t over a oneyear period (CAARs).The CAARs of all non-financial companies listed on London Stock Exchange (LSE) which meet the criteria of the data requirements for the research study are allocated to the 10 leverage portfolios. Portfolio assignments are made yearly at the beginning of May in year t until the end of April of year t+1. Leverage is observed as of the beginning of May of year t. Leverage is obtained from Datastream (DS CODE: WC08221), represents the total debt to the total financing of the firms and is defined as in equation (1 
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Figure 1
Figure 1 shows the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) across the leverage deciles. Stock returns for each company are calculated on a monthly basis and are defined as the percentage difference of consecutive closing prices adjusted for dividends, splits and rights issues. The returns are accumulated from May of year t over a one-year period (CAARs).
Leverage is observed as of the beginning of May of year t (Datastream Code: WC08221). It represents the total debt to total financing of the firm and is defined as in equation (1). The CAARs of all non-financial companies listed on London Stock Exchange (LSE) which meet the criteria of the data requirements for the research study are allocated to the 10 leverage portfolios. Portfolio assignments are made yearly at the beginning of May in year t until the end of April of year t+1. Leverage decile 1 denotes firms with the lowest leverage and leverage decile 10 represents firms with the highest leverage. 
CAARS ACROSS LEVERAGE DECILES OVER THE HOLDING PERIOD
Figure 2
Figure 2 shows the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) across the leverage deciles. Stock returns for each company are calculated on a monthly basis and are defined as the percentage difference of consecutive closing prices adjusted for dividends, splits and rights issues. The returns are accumulated from May of year t over a one-year period (CAARs).
CAARS ACROSS LEVERAGE DECILES FOR DIFFERENT RISK CLASSES
LEVERAGE DECILES
RETURNS (%)
basic materials consumer goods consumer services healthcare industrials oil & gas technology telecommunications utilities
